A lightweight cloud sharing PHR system with access policy updating by YING, Zuobin et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Information 
Systems School of Information Systems 
10-2018 
A lightweight cloud sharing PHR system with access policy 
updating 
Zuobin YING 
Wenjie JANG 
Shuanlong CAO 
Ximeng LIU 
Singapore Management University, xmliu@smu.edu.sg 
Jie CUI 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research 
 Part of the Information Security Commons 
Citation 
YING, Zuobin; JANG, Wenjie; CAO, Shuanlong; LIU, Ximeng; and CUI, Jie. A lightweight cloud sharing PHR 
system with access policy updating. (2018). IEEE Access. 6, 64611-64621. Research Collection School Of 
Information Systems. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5142 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore 
Management University. For more information, please email library@smu.edu.sg. 
SPECIAL SECTION ON EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES FOR
DEVICE TO DEVICE COMMUNICATIONS
Received September 30, 2018, accepted October 20, 2018, date of publication October 25, 2018,
date of current version November 30, 2018.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2877981
A Lightweight Cloud Sharing PHR System
With Access Policy Updating
ZUOBIN YING 1, (Member, IEEE), WENJIE JANG1, SHUANGLONG CAO1,
XIMENG LIU 2,3, (Member, IEEE), AND JIE CUI 1
1School of Computer Science and Technology, Anhui University, Hefei 230601 China
2College of Mathematics and Computer Science, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China
3School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178902
Corresponding author: Cui Jie (cuijie@mail.ustc.edu.cn)
This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant U1405255, Grant 61572001, Grant
61502008, Grant 61702005, Grant 61502248, Grant 61427801, and Grant 61702105.
ABSTRACT The rapid development of smart wearable devices makes personal health management feasible,
which also stimulates the evolution of personal health records (PHRs). However, PHRs face many security
challenges ever since it has been created. Besides, the complicated policy adjusting operation makes the
PHRs stored in the cloud not so easy to use. In this paper, we propose a lightweight PHRs system on the
basis of attribute-based encryption with policy updating. To update an outsourced ciphertext PHRs in the
cloud, PHRs owners only need to generate an updating key, then upload it to the cloud server instead of
retrieving the entire ciphertexts. We proved the security of our scheme, and the experiment result indicates
that our system is much more efficient than the brute force way of ciphertext updating.
INDEX TERMS Personal health records, device-to-device, ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption,
policy update, smart wearable device, cloud computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoTs) and cloud computing are the main
building block of the new generation information technol-
ogy. They become the next ‘‘major productivity’’ to promote
the world’s high-speed development. Meanwhile, the rapid
development of device-to-device (D2D) technology makes
the communication much more reliable and convenient.
D2D communication is a promising technology that permits
devices to communicate directlywithout access points or base
station interactions. In the approaching 5G era, D2D com-
munication will also be popularized to alleviate the shortage
of spectrum resources in wireless communication systems.
D2D has different applications in different networks, such
as Peer to Peer (P2P) in Ad hoc network and Machine to
Machine (M2M) in the IoTs. There is no essential difference
between these different jargons, but they are adapted to meet
their specific needs in their respective application scenar-
ios. One of the most typical applications is Smart Wearable
Devices (SWDs), which are integrated with physiological
sensors, low-power computing, communication and storage
modules as a bridge connecting the human body and the infor-
mation world. These devices can sense different information
from humans, such as physiological parameters, health status,
movement and location. Therefore, through D2D technology,
we can transmit data to the smart phones and other mobile
devices around us at any time, then the smart phones will
process and upload the data to the cloud. In addition, we can
share real-time data on our SWDs with friends through social
network, such as travels or health-related information etc.
However, some security issues may happen when we transmit
data to smart phones or share data to peripheral devices. For
example, malicious nodes may illegally intercept and discard
packets to be forwarded. In addition, malicious nodes can
obtain some private data by distributing forged public keys.
Thus, privacy became one of themain restrictions that encum-
bers the development of D2D, especially in some privacy high
demand scenarios, health care, for example.
With the increasing concern about the health, health related
research is becoming more and more crucial. PHRs are
directly formed by people in health-related activities and have
the value of preservation and reference characterized with
security and confidentiality. Personal health information in
PHRs includes basic information, summaries of major dis-
eases and health problems, records of major health services.
The information recorded in PHRs mainly comes from medi-
cal service records, health examination, disease investigation
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and the SWDs. The standardization and digitization of var-
ious records have enabled information sharing among med-
ical institutions, patients and health departments. After the
PHRs system is completely established, the management of
people’s health information will be more simple, faster and
safer.
The following five points need to be considered in order to
implement the PHRs system:
(1) In theory, the PHRs system should be able to cover all
residents, whichmakes the PHRs system have a great demand
for physical storage resources.
(2) The requirements of PHRs system: one side of the input
while multi-use, which means that the PHRs system needs to
have an appropriate way of sharing.
(3) Because the PHRs are the residents’ personal health
statistics, the PHRs system has a higher requirement to pro-
tect users’ privacy.
(4) According to the privacy required by the third point,
users should have the right tomanage their own health records
(which means that users can determine the access rights of
health records), so the PHRs system should have the function
of dynamic updating access rights.
(5) PHRs system should have the function of statistics
users’ real-time health data through SWDs.
Cloud computing can meet the requirements of physical
storage system and data sharing of PHRs mentioned in the
first and second points above. However, cloud is generally
considered to be untrustworthy because it will sniffer as
much personal information as possible, which is particularly
sensitive in PHRs. At the same time, these data are also of
great commercial value, thus become a target of the attackers.
This makes it necessary to solve this user privacy preserving
problem in order to construct a fully-functional PHRs system.
According to the characteristics of PHRs system and cloud
environment, the encryption scheme should have good secu-
rity, fine-grained access control function, and can be applied
to cloud computing environment. Therefore, attribute based
encryption scheme (ABE) [5] is our preferred option.
It should be noted that the CP-ABE scheme itself does not
provide efficient policy updating methods. In the past, when
the access policywas updated in CP-ABE, the following steps
were normally completed:
(1) Generate new access policy.
(2) Generate new ciphertext by using new access policy.
(3) Upload the new ciphertext to the cloud server to replace
the old ciphertext.
From the above three steps we can see that to update
access policy needs to regenerate the entire ciphertext, which
consumes a lot of computing resources and makes the update
very inefficient. In fact, policy updating in CP-ABE do not
require regenerating the entire ciphertext, but only some parts
of the ciphertext. We can briefly describe this process as
follows:
(1) Generate new access policy.
(2) Compare the difference between the new access strat-
egy and the old access strategy.
(3) Generate part of new ciphertext based on the results of
the above step comparison.
(4) Upload the results of step (3) to the cloud server and
replace part of the values in the old ciphertext.
Comparing the above two processes, we can find that
the complete ciphertext is regenerated in the first process,
and some ciphertext is regenerated in the second process.
When the user makes subtle adjustments to the access policy,
the first process consumes a large amount of computing
resources, while the second process consumes only a small
amount of computing resources compared to the first process.
When the user makes considerable changes to the access
policy, the first process still regenerates the entire cipher-
text, while the second process generates only a portion of
the ciphertext. This shows that the second process always
generates only a portion of the ciphertext, and the first process
always generates the entire ciphertext without the user com-
pletely changing the access policy. When the access policy
is completely changed, the two processes consume a lot of
computing resources.
However, CP-ABE itself cannot encrypt complex data,
so the application of CP-ABE in PHRs system should adopt
mixed encryption, that is, symmetric encryption and asym-
metric encryption. Generally speaking, in the case of encrypt-
ing complex data, the efficiency of symmetric encryption is
better than asymmetric encryption. Therefore, in our scheme,
CP-ABE is used to encrypt the symmetric encryption key, and
the symmetric key is used to encrypt the PHRs data.
Besides, SWDs only have some simple, data-gathering
capabilities, and statistics of these data will be placed on
the user’s mobile device or on the cloud, but as we have
discussed above, cloud is considered not entirely credible,
so we think statistics of collected data should be computed
on personal mobile devices. In order to make the data col-
lected by SWDs can be timely transmitted to mobile devices,
we believe that D2D communication technology will be a
good choice. As shown in Fig. 1, it is a structural diagram
of a PHRs system.
FIGURE 1. A Personal Health Records (PHRs) system.
The main contribution of our work can be summarized as
follows:
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(1) We construct a concrete PHRs privacy preserving sys-
tem which can either protect the individuals health infor-
mation at the primary phase of data collection from SWDs,
or preserve the privacy at the cloud sharing phase.
(2) A practical and lightweight policy updating CP-ABE
algorithm is designed to reduce the computation as well as
the communication cost of the PHRs owners, especially in the
energy constraint scenarios. The simulation indicates that our
proposed scheme only introduces a small overhead compared
with the scheme without health information protection.
(3) The scheme is proposed to be adaptively secure under
random oraclemodel.We also proved that the policy updating
procedure will not reveal further helpful information to the
adversary.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the background of some technologies in
PHRs systems, these include PHRs, CP-ABE, SWDs,
and D2D communication related background knowledge.
In Section III, we made some necessary preliminaries for
our policy updating plan of CP-ABE. In Section IV, we give
the definition, system model and security model of CP-ABE
scheme with policy updating function. In Section V, the
CP-ABE scheme with policy updating function is described
in detail. In Section VI, we carried out security analysis
and performance analysis. Finally, Section VII gives the
conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
• Device-To-Device (D2D): Initially, device-to-device
(D2D) communication was defined as direct data commu-
nication between two devices without access point (AP)
or intermediate base station (BS). The most typical D2D
applications are Bluetooth [7], WiFi-Direct [8] and Near
Field Communications (NFC) [9]. D2D communication is
considered to be the key technology to realize the next
generation mobile communication network and wireless sys-
tem (5G). To solve the problem of limited computing power
in 5G mobile networks, [12] proposes a Knowledge-Centric
Edge (KCE) architecture, which can achieve reliable network
access and maximize the utilization of network resources.
Besides communication efficiency, security issues in D2D
have attract more and more attention. Wu et al. [13] propose
a new Resisting On-Off Attack Data Forwarding Mecha-
nism (OADM) to resist switching attacks for mobile agents.
Mobile Social Networks (MSNs) detects switching attacks,
which not only prevents malicious nodes from intercepting
packets, but also makes use of nodes to cooperatively forward
packets. In order to solve the problem of using forged public
keys to obtain privacy data.We et al. [11] proposes a dynamic
trust relationships aware data privacy protection (DTRPP)
mechanism.
• Personal Health Records (PHRs): Information and
communication technology (ICT) has changed the health care
world around the world. One of the main drivers of this
change is the electronic health records (EHRs). However,
there are still some open problems and challenges because
EHRs usually reflects a one-sided view of a healthcare
provider without the ability of patients to control or interact
with their data. In addition, with the development of mobile
computing and pervasive computing, the number of PHRs has
increased exponentially. This movement is described as the
IoTs, which includes the extensive development of wearable
computing technology and a variety of health-related sensors.
This leads to the need for a comprehensive approach to store
health-related data, defined as PHRs, which can be used by
health care providers and patients. This method can combine
EHRs with data collected from sensors or other SWDs. This
unified view of patient health can be shared with providers,
who can use not only previous health-related records, but
also data generated through interactions to expand them.
Another advantage of PHRs is that patients can interact with
their health data to make decisions that may have a positive
impact on their health [15]. Among them, [14] reviewed the
changing clinical challenges posed by the implementation
of PHRs, which are fully integrated with electronic medical
records (EMRs).
• Attribute Based Encryption (ABE): Attribute-Based
Encryption is a one-to-many cryptography prototype. With
the purpose of achieving fine-grained access control, access
policy is introduced. Data owners set the appropriate access
policies, then attached them to either the ciphertext side to
form Ciphertext Policy-ABE (CP-ABE) [16] or the attribute
key side to form Key Policy-ABE (KP-ABE) [17]. However,
only a few of the state-of-art ABE schemes take arbitrary
form of policy updating into account. Some of the policy
adjusting works only support policy retrench, which basis
on the theory of credential authorization [18]. Yang et al.
first propose a CP-ABE scheme which can realize any kinds
of policy updating besides policy retrench [19]. Data owner
only have to generate update keys then upload them to the
cloud without retrieving the entire ciphertext, after receiving
the updating key element, the cloud server will update the
corresponding ciphertext components. The scheme is con-
structed on the generic order group and random oracle model.
In order to realize higher security level. Ying et al. [20]
proposed another policy updating scheme, which is proved to
be adaptively secure under standard model. But their scheme
is constructed on composite order group, so it is not practical
to be used. Yuan andWei [21] put forward an policy updating
algorithm based on matrix update. Moving one step forward,
we proposed a more efficient policy updating mechanism
which could face the energy constraint as well as personal
health information preserving needs of PHRs with SWDs
scenario.
III. PRELIMINARIES
First, the formal definition and related background of access
structure in Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) are given,
then the structure of CP-ABE and its security definition are
given. Finally, we give the background information of bilinear
mapping.
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A. ACCESS STRUCTURES
Access Structure [10]: Let {P1,P2, · · · ,Pn} be a set of par-
ties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,··· ,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C :
if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. An access struc-
ture(respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection
(respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets
of {P1,P2, · · · ,Pn}, i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,··· ,Pn}\{∅}. The sets
in A are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are
called the unauthorized sets.
In our context, the role of the parties is taken by the
attributes. Thus, the access structure A will contain the
authorized sets of attributes. We restrict our attention to
monotone access structures. However, it is also possible
to (inefficiently) realize general access structures using our
techniques by having the not of an attribute as a separate
attribute altogether. Thus, the number of attributes in the sys-
tem will be doubled. From now on, unless stated otherwise,
by an access structure we mean a monotone access structure.
B. LINEAR SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
We will make essential use of linear secret-sharing schemes.
We adapt our definitions from those given in [10]:
A secret-sharing scheme5 over a set of parties P is called
linear (over Zp) if
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. There exists a matrix an M with ` rows and n columns
called the share-generatingmatrix for5. For all i = 1, · · · , `,
the i’th row of M we let the function ρ defined the party
labeling row i as ρ(i). When we consider the column vector
υ = (s, r2, · · · , rn), where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared,
and r2, · · · , rn ∈ Zp are randomly chosen, then Mυ is the
vector of ` shares of the secret s according to 5. The share
(Mυ)i belongs to party ρ(i).
It is shown in [10] that every linear secret sharing-scheme
according to the above definition also enjoys the linear recon-
struction property, defined as follows: Suppose that 5 is an
LSSS for the access structure A. Let S ∈ A be any authorized
set, and let I ∈ {1, 2, · · · , `} be defined as I = {i :
ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, there exist constants {ωi ∈ Zp} such that,
if {λi} are valid shares of any secret s according to 5, then∏
i∈I ωiλi = s. Furthermore, it is shown in [10] that these
constants {ωi} can be found in time polynomial in the size of
the share-generating matrix M .
We note that we use the convention that vector
(1, 0, 0, · · · , 0) is the target vector for any linear secret
sharing scheme. For any satisfying set of rows I in M ,
we will have that the target vector is in the span of I . For
any unauthorized set of rows I the target vector is not in the
span of the rows of the set I . Moreover, there will exist a
vector ω such that ω · (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0) = −1 and ω ·Mi = 0
for all i ∈ I .
Prior works on ABE (e.g., [11]) typically described
access formulas in terms of binary trees. Using standard
techniques [10] one can convert any monotonic boolean for-
mula into an LSSS representation. An access tree of ` nodes
will result in an LSSS matrix of ` rows.
C. CP-ABE SCHEME
A CP-ABE scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup,
Encrypt, KeyGen, Decrypt.
Setup (λ,U ) The setup algorithm takes security parameter
and attribute universe description as input. It outputs the
public parameters PK and a master key MSK .
Key Generation (MSK , S) The key generation algorithm
takes as input the master key MSK and a set of attributes S
that describe the key. It outputs a private key SK .
Encrypt (PK ,msg,A) The encryption algorithm takes as
input the public parameters PK ,msg, and an access struc-
ture A over the universe of attributes. The algorithm will
encrypt msg and produce a ciphertext CT such that only a
user that possesses a set of attributes that satisfies the access
structure will be able to decrypt the message. We will assume
that the ciphertext implicitly contains A.
Decrypt (PK ,CT , SK ) The decryption algorithm takes
as input the public parameters PK , a ciphertext CT , which
contains an access policy A, and a private key SK , which is
a private key for a set S of attributes. If the set S of attributes
satisfies the access structureA then the algorithmwill decrypt
the ciphertext and return the msg.
D. BILINEAR MAPS
We present a few facts related to groups with efficiently
computable bilinear maps and then give our number theoretic
assumptions.
LetG andGT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order p. Let g be a generator of G and e be a bilinear map,
e : G × G → GT . The bilinear map e has the following
properties:
(1) Bilinear: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp, we have
e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
(2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operation
in G and the bilinear map e : G × G → GT are both
efficiently computable. Notice that the map e is symmetric
since e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab = e(gb, ga).
IV. DEFINITIONS
In this section, we give a brief introduction of the policy
update system model. Then we define the proposed scheme
as well as the security model. In order to make our proposed
scheme easier to read. We notate the symbols and the corre-
sponding explainations in Table 1.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
The policy update scheme we provide consists of the fol-
lowing parts: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Update.
Besides in our scheme, Encrypt consists of SE-Enc,
KEY-Enc. Correspondingly, the Decrypt also consists of
two sub-algorithms,KEY-Dec and SE-Dec. Specially, in our
scheme SE represents a symmetric encryption scheme which
consists of two functions, SE.Enc and SE.Dec.
Setup(U )→ (PK ,MSK ,Mkey): The setup algorithm takes
as input the number of attributes in the system. It outputs the
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public key PK , the master secret keyMSK andMkey which is
selected randomly from GT .
KeyGen (MSK , S)→ SK : The key generation algorithm
takes as input the master secret key and a set S of attributes.
It outputs the corresponding secret key SK .
Encrypt(PK ,Mkey, (M, ρ),msg) → (CTmsg,CTkey): The
encryption algorithm consists of two sub-algorithm, namely,
KEY-Enc and SE-Enc.
• SE-Enc(PK ,Mkey,msg) → CTmsg: The SE-Enc sub-
algorithm takes as input the Mkey, PK and compute Kse ←
H(Mkey) whichH(x) is from PK , then it takes Kse andmsg to
encrypt. It output the ciphertext CTmsg.
• KEY-Enc(PK , (M, ρ),Mkey) → CTkey: The KEY-Enc
sub-algorithm takes as input the public key PK and Mkey.
In addition, it takes as input an LSSS access structure (M, ρ).
The function ρ associates rows ofM to attributes. It takes the
ciphertext CTkey as an output.
Decrypt((CTmsg,CTkey), SK ) → msg: Corresponding to
encryption algorithm, the decryption algorithm also consists
of two sub-algorithm, namely, KEY-Dec and SE-Dec.
• KEY-Dec(CTkey, SK ) → Mkey: The KEY-Dec sub-
algorithm takes as inputCTkey and a private key SK for a set S.
It outputs Mkey if the attributes satisfy the policy, or⊥if not.
• SE-Dec(CTmsg,Mkey) → msg: The SE-Dec sub-
algorithm takes as input CTmsg and the output of KEY-Dec
sub-algorithm, and then it computes Kse ← H(Mkey) for
decrypting. The output of SE-Dec sub-algorithm is msg.
Update(PK ,A,A′) → CT ′key: The Update algorithm
consists of two parts, namely, LOCAL-Update and
CLOUD-Update.
• LOCAL-Update(PK ,A,A′) → CU : The LOCAL-
Update algorithm takes as input system public key PK ,
the old access structure A and the new access structure A′
as input. Output ciphertext update component CU .
• CLOUD-Update(CU ,CTkey) → CT ′key: The CLOUD-
Update algorithm takes as input the update component CU
and the ciphertext CTkey, Output the new ciphertext CT ′key
which has been updated and this part will be executed in
cloud.
B. SECURITY MODEL
We now describe a security model for our lightweight and
efficient policy update CP-ABE schemes. Like CP-ABE and
IBE schemes [6], [12] the security model allows the adver-
sary to query for any private keys that cannot be used to
decrypt the challenge ciphertext. In our scheme the cipher-
texts are identified with access structures and the private keys
with attributes. It follows that in our security definition the
adversary will choose to be challenged on an encryption to
an access structure A∗ and can ask for any private key S such
that S does not satisfy A∗. We now give the formal security
game Security Model for our policy update CP-ABE.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives
the public parameters, PK to the adversary.
Phase 1. The adversary makes repeated private keys corre-
sponding to sets of attributes S1, · · · , Sq1.
TABLE 1. Notations.
Challenge. The adversary submits two equal length mes-
sagesM0 andM1. In addition the adversary gives a challenge
access structure A∗ such that none of the sets S1, · · · , Sq1
from Phase 1 satisfy the access structure. The challenger flips
a random coin b, and encrypts Mb under A∗. The ciphertext
CT∗ is given to the adversary.
Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated with the restriction that none
of sets of attributes Sq1+1, · · · , Sq satisfy the access structure
corresponding to the challenge.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of an adversary in this game is defined as
Pr[b′ = b] − 1/2. We note that the model can easily be
extended to handle chosen-ciphertext attacks by allowing for
decryption queries in Phase 1 and Phase 2.
V. CONSTRUCTIONS OF OUR SCHEME
A. MAIN IDEA
Changes in access policies in CP-ABE will directly lead
to changes in access structure. The access structure (M, ρ)
consists of two parts: access matrix M and mapping func-
tion ρ. The mapping function ρ is used to preserve the
correspondence between the attribute associated with a row
in the access matrix M and the row number of the attribute
in the access matrix M, so the mapping function ρ changes
with the order of the rows in the access matrixM (note here
that the order of the rows changes, not the value of the rows).
So for the change of access structure, we mainly focus on
the change of access matrixM. On the other hand, when the
values of some rows in the accessmatrixM change, according
to the principle of the linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS),
we find that some ciphertext components in the ciphertext
will change directly. In summary, we can find that when the
access policy changes, it will directly lead to the change of
access matrix M, and the change of access matrix will indi-
rectly lead to the change ofmapping function ρ and ciphertext
components. However, the changes in ciphertext components
are more noticeable than changes in access matrices M and
mapping functions ρ, because the computational overhead
of generating ciphertext components is extraordinarily large
compared to other operations.
In CP-ABE, the access structure (M, ρ) is generated with
the input of the access policy according to the principle of
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FIGURE 2. Access Policy: ( 1 AND 2 ) OR 3.
FIGURE 3. Access Policy: ( 1 OR 2 ) AND 3.
FIGURE 4. Access Policy: ( 1 AND 2 ) OR 3.
the LSSS. The access structure is shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
As can be seen from the graph, the generation of access
matrix M is transformed from the access policy binary tree,
and the access policy binary tree is transformed from the
access policy, the specific process is as follows:
(1) The structure of the node in the binary tree is composed
of two parts, namely type and value, in which type is a string
and value is a multi-dimensional vector; in the binary tree,
there are two kinds of nodes, namely, intermediate node and
attribute node, we can see thin in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 5(a).
(2) First, the access strategy is transformed into a binary
tree.
(3) Assign value to the root node of the binary tree. The
root node is assigned to vector E1 by default. The assignment
of a non-root node depends on its parent node: assuming that
the parent node’s vector value is EV , when the parent node’s
type is ‘OR’, the vector value of its two children’s nodes is EV ;
when the parent node’s type is ‘AND’, the vector value of its
left child’s node is equal to (1, EV ), and the vector value of
its right child’s node is equal to (0, · · · , 0,−1) the number
of ‘0’ is equal to the length of the vector EV , and we can see
this in Fig. 4(b), Fig. 5(b).
(4) To store the values of all the attribute nodes in the
access policy tree into the matrix M, it is necessary to note
that when the dimension of the vector values of the attribute
nodes is different, the dimension of all the vectors is enlarged
based on the vector with the largest dimension, and the rule
is to supplement ‘0’ at the end, for example, the vector EV
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FIGURE 5. Access Policy: ( 1 OR 2 ) AND 3.
FIGURE 6. A policy update process (A = A, A′ = A′).
is supplemented by ‘0’ to obtain ( EV , 0),we can see this
in Fig. 4(c) and Fig. 5(c).
(5) Save the row number of the generated accessmatrix and
the type of its corresponding attribute node into the mapping
function.
When the access structure is generated, the ciphertext com-
ponent needs to be generated according to the access matrix
and LSSS,the concrete process is as follows:
(1) Vector Eν = (s, y2, y3, · · · , yn) is a vector related to the
linear secret sharing scheme, whose dimension is equal to the
number of columns of the access matrixM, and s which is in
the Eν is the secret who is going to be shared.
(2) First, we compute
λi = −→M i · Eν
−→
M i is the vector value of the ith row of the accessmatrixM.
Then, we compute
Ci = gaλih−riρ(i),Di = gri , ri ∈ Zp
Remark: we can find that the influence factors of cipher-
text components are
policy-string→ (M, ρ)→ λi→ (Ci,Di)
and comparing Fig. 4(c) and Fig. 5(c), we can see that the vec-
tor values in the access matrixM do not change entirely when
the policy changes, for example, the vector corresponding to
the attribute ‘1’ is still (1, 1) after the change of access policy.
This means that λi does not change entirely. Similarly, this
means that ciphertext components do not change entirely.
Therefore, we can conclude that when the access policy
changes, there is no need to change the entire ciphertext
component, but only a part of it.
B. SCHEME CONSTRATION
(1) Setup(U ) The setup algorithm takes as input the number
of attributes in the system. It then chooses a group G of
prime order p, a generator g and U random group elements
h1, · · · , hU ∈ G that are associated with the U attributes
in the system. In addition, it chooses random exponents
α, a ∈ Zp and an anti-collision hash functionH(x).
The public key is published as
PK = g, e(g, g)α, ga, h1, ..., hU ,H(x)
The authority sets MSK = gα as the master secret
key. A randomly selected element Mkey ∈ GT , which
G×G→ GT .
(2) KeyGen (MSK , S) The key generation algorithm takes
as input the master secret key and a set S of attributes. The
algorithm first chooses a random t ∈ Zp. It creates the private
key as
K = gαgαt ,L = gt ,∀x ∈ S,Kx = hxt
(3) Encrypt(PK ,Mkey, (M, ρ),Mphr ) The encryption
algorithm consists of two sub-algorithm, namely, KEY-Enc
and SE-Enc.
• SE-Enc(Mkey,Mphr ) This sub-algorithm takes as input
the Mkey and Mphr , then computes:
Kse← H(Mkey)
the ciphertext CTphr is published as
CTphr = SE.Enc(Kse,Mphr )
• KEY-Enc(PK , (M, ρ),Mkey) This sub-algorithm takes
as input the public parameters PK and Mkey to encrypt.
In addition, it takes as input an LSSS access structure (M, ρ).
The function ρ associates rows ofM to attributes.
Let M be an ` × n matrix. The algorithm first chooses a
random vector Ev = (s, y2, · · · , yn) ∈ Zpn. These values will
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be used to share the secret s. For i = 1 to `, it calculates
λi = Ev · Mi, where Mi is the vector corresponding to the
ith row of M. In addition, the algorithm chooses random
r1, · · · , r` ∈ Zp.
The ciphertext is published as CTkey =
Ckey=Mkey · e(g, g)αs,C ′ = gs,
(C1= gaλ1h−r1ρ(1),D1 = gr1 ), · · · , (C` = gaλ`h−r`ρ(`),D` = gr` )
along with a description of (M, ρ).
4) Decrypt(CTkey,CTphr , SK ) The decryption algorithm
also consists of two sub-algorithm, namely, KEY-Dec and
SE-Dec.
KEY-Dec(CTkey, SK ) This sub-algorithm takes as input a
ciphertext CTkey for access structure (M, ρ) and a private key
for a set S. Suppose that S satisfies the access structure and
let I ⊂ 1, 2, · · · , ` be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, let
{ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such that if {λi} are valid
shares of any secret s according to M, then
∏
i∈I ωiλi = s.
(Note there could potentially be different ways of choosing
the ωi values to satisfy this).
The decryption algorithm first computes
e(C ′,K )/(
∏
i∈I
(e(Ci,L)e(Di,Kρ)(i))ωi ) =
e(g, g)αse(g, g)ast/(
∏
i∈I
e(g, g)taλiωi ) = e(g, g)αs
The decryption algorithm can then divide out this value
from Ckey and obtain the Mkey.
SE-Dec(CTphr ,Mkey) This sub-algorithm takes as input the
ciphertext CTphr and the output of KEY-Dec sub-algorithm,
it first computes:
Kse← H(Mkey)
the SE-Dec sub-algorithm then computes:
Mphr = SE .DEC(CTphr ,Kse)
(5) Policy-Update(PK ,A,A′) The Update algorithm con-
sists of two parts, namely, Local-Update and Cloud-Update.
The Local-Update algorithm takes as input system public
key PK , the old access structure A and the new access struc-
tureA′ as input,output ciphertext update componentCU , The
Cloud-Update algorithm takes as input the update component
CU , output the new ciphertext which has been updated.
• Local-Update(PK ,A,A′) The access structure consists
of (M, ρ), where M is a matrix composed of vectors Mi to
share secret s, and ρ is used to represent the correspondence
between rows and attributes in the matrixM.
When we want to update the policy, we first compare the
matrix M′ in the newly generated access structure A′ with
the access matrix M in the old access structure A, and get
an update vector set MU . MU contains all the changed row
vectorsMUi relative to the original access matrixM. Then we
calculate λUi =MUi ·(s, y2, · · · , yn) according to the method
of linear secret sharing.
The I ′ is an updated attribute set which I ′ = {U1,
U2, · · · ,Un}, then we calculate CUi, i ∈ I ′ by encryption
algorithm.
Update component is published as CUi =
(TUi ,CUi = gaλUih
−rUi
ρ(Ui)
,DUi = grUi )
TUi indicates what operations should be performed when
the cloud server receives the updated component CUi. TUi
refers to three operations, adding ciphertext components,
deleting the original ciphertext component and modifying the
original ciphertext component.
• Cloud-Update(CU ,CTkey)This part is executed in the
cloud. The input of the algorithm is the original ciphertext
CTkey and the update component CU , the output is the new
ciphertext CT ′key corresponding to the new access policy A′.
When the algorithm is executed, the operations (modifi-
cation, insertion, deletion) for the ciphertext component cor-
responding to attribute i(i = Ui) are determined according to
the TUi in the update component.When the TUi representation
is modification, the ciphertext components Ci and Di corre-
sponding to the attribute i(i = Ui) in the original ciphertext
CT are found and replaced with CUi and DUi ; if the TUi
representation is insertion, CUi and DUi are inserted into the
original ciphertext CT ; if the TUi representation is deletion,
the ciphertext components Ci and Di corresponding to the
original ciphertext CT are found and deleted according to the
attribute i(i = Ui). In general, the updating process can be
described as Fig. 6.
VI. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our lightweight policy update scheme is constructed on
prime order groups, which is much faster than those ones
on composite order groups. In this part, we will prove
that our lightweight policy update scheme is secure in
the generic bilinear group model [3], [23], [24] and random
oracle model [25].
Theorem 3. Our scheme is secure in the generic bilinear
group model and random oracle model, if no polynomial time
adversary can get non-negligible advantage in the security
game defined in Section IV-B.
Proof: In this paper, an access control scheme is con-
structed based on the CP-ABE method in reference [22]. It is
proved that the scheme is secure under the generalized bilin-
ear group model and the random oracle model. This means
that if there is any vulnerability in our scheme, these vul-
nerabilities must take advantage of the special mathematical
properties of the elliptic curve group. Or the encryption hash
function used in the actual scenario. To make a adversary A
an advantage that we can’t ignore. We will construct a A′,
which will break the [22] scheme and have an advantage that
can not be ignored.
In our security game, the adversary returns access struc-
ture A∗ which is (M∗, ρ∗) with two message (m0,m1), and
the adversary receives the ciphertext CTb which is obtained
by plaintext Mb through the access structure (M∗, ρ∗)
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TABLE 2. Comparison of encryption and decryption time of AES 128.
encryption. The adversary A′ initialize CP-ABE security
game, and forward the public key PK to A.
To simulate the update ciphertext component generation
ofA,A′ queries its update ciphertext component generation.
The simulation of challenge ciphertext of A is the same with
the one of A′.
Now, we prove that the update ciphertext component
query in our security game will not increase the advantage
of A′. Considering two update ciphertext component queries
UC(m0, (M∗, ρ∗)) andUC(m1, (M∗, ρ∗)), the update cipher-
text component generation returns the same update ciphertext
component which do not involve with the challenge data.
If we take into account the random numbers used in encrypt-
ing m0 and m1, we can assume that the random numbers that
we have used are the same, because the simulator tosses a
coin in a secure game and selects only one challengemessage.
Therefore, the update ciphertext component will not reveal
any information on the chosen challenging message. This
completes the proof.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We proposed two update sub-algorithms on the basis of
CP-ABE, which are LOCAL-Update and CLOUD-Update.
We deploy the experiment environment on the Ubuntu Linux
Desktop 64 bit-system with an Intel Core i7 CPU at 3.4GHz
and 8.00GB RAM. The code utilizes the charm library ver-
sion 0.50 and an asymmetric elliptic curve α-curve, where
the base field size is 512-bit and the embedding degree
is 2, so that the security parameter is 1024-bit. In order to
generate symmetric keys from GT group, we employ the
MurmurHash3. All the experimental result are the mean
of 100 trails.
It can be seen from the Fig. 7(a) that with the increase of the
number of attributes, the time of Kegen, encrypy, decrypt, and
update algorithms all show an increasing trend. The update
time is obviously much less than other time overhead, and
with the increase of the number of attributes, the time of
update algorithm does not increase significantly, and in this
experiment, AES 128 encryption and decryption algorithm is
used to test the encryption and decryption time of different
size files. From the Fig. 7(b), as the size of the file increases,
encryption and decryption also increased significantly, and
the increase in encryption is indeed close to the same.
In Fig. 8(a) we tested the relationship between the number
of ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ and the time. The initial number of
‘AND’ and ‘OR’ is 0, and then increases by 4, 8, 12, 16 in
turn. As the number of ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ increases, their time
overhead increases, and the increase in time is roughly the
same. The relationship between the number of ‘AND’ and
FIGURE 7. Computation cost of our scheme.
FIGURE 8. Overhead of our policy update scheme.
‘OR’ reduction and time was tested in Fig. 8(b). The initial
number of ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ is 20, and then decreases by 4,
8, 12, 16 in turn. From the images, it can be seen that when
the number of ‘AND’ decreases, its time overhead shows
a downward trend, while the initial time overhead of ‘OR’
is very small, with the number of ‘OR’ decreases, the time
changes little.
FIGURE 9. Communication cost of our scheme.
In Fig. 9 we tested the time cost of uploading differ-
ent small files to the server and downloading from the
server. Because the network speed of the local network is
stable, the time of uploading and downloading files increases
with the increase of file size, and the time cost of uploading
increases obviously.
We also evaluate the encryption and decryption over-
head of AES-128, the extra overhead comparison is listed
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TABLE 3. Compare the time of adding ‘AND’ and the time of adding ‘OR’.
in Table 2. Besides, in Table 3 we give specific time cost for
adding ‘AND’ and adding ‘OR’.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we applied the CP-ABE scheme to the electronic
health records system. Based on the difference between the
PHRs and other data, we propose a policy update method
based on the CP-ABE scheme. Unlike other policy update
methods, we implement partial ciphertext update, which
greatly reduces the computational overhead of ciphertext
update in policy update. But at the same time, we need the
cloud server to identify and process the updated ciphertext
components, which to some extent increases the computing
overhead of the cloud server. In addition, our scheme does
not take into account the special privacy requirements of
PHRs, which may be achieved by policy hiding. But the new
problem will be how to combine policy hiding with policy
updating.
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